After a Stay, Does the Clock Resume or Start Over?

What happens to a procedural time limit when UPC proceedings are stayed?

Does the clock simply stop and resume where it left off once the proceedings continue? Or does the party get the full procedural period again?

In an order dated 3 September 2026 in In(k)control v. Esko (UPC_CFI_871/2026), the UPC Brussels Local Division addressed this question.

Rule 296(3) RoP provides:

“While proceedings are stayed, time shall cease to run for the purposes of procedural periods. Time shall begin to run afresh for the purposes of procedural periods from the date on which the stay of proceedings comes to an end.”

The key issue was the meaning of “afresh”: does it mean “anew”, or does it mean “again”?

The Brussels Local Division opted for the latter. In its view, a stay temporarily suspends the running of a procedural period; it does not wipe out the time that has already elapsed.

1. 29 days remaining, or a fresh three months?

The underlying case is a patent infringement action. The parties jointly requested a stay under Rule 295(d) RoP in view of forthcoming amicable settlement negotiations. The Court subsequently stayed both the infringement proceedings and the ancillary proceedings concerning the application for security, with effect from 29 May 2026.

No settlement was reached, and the parties requested that the proceedings be resumed.

The statement of claim had been served on 26 March 2026. The Defendants had three months to file their statement of defence, meaning that the original period would have expired on 26 June 2026. When the stay took effect on 29 May, the Court calculated that 29 days remained.

The Defendants argued that, once the stay ended, the procedural periods should “begin to run afresh” and requested a deadline of 30 November 2026 for filing the statement of defence. The Claimant, by contrast, argued that a stay suspends rather than interrupts the procedural period, so that only the remaining time should continue to run.

The Brussels Local Division agreed with the latter interpretation.

The Court started with the first sentence of Rule 296(3): while proceedings are stayed, time “shall cease to run”. In the Court’s view, this refers not to an interruption but to a stay (or "suspension") of proceedings. Applied to a procedural period, "suspension" means a temporary pause.

The second sentence must therefore be read together with the first. Against that background, “begin to run afresh” means that the period begins to run “again”, rather than that a new full period begins “anew”.

The Court therefore held that, upon resumption, the procedural periods continue to run taking into account the time that had already elapsed before the stay. Its order resuming the proceedings was issued on 3 September 2026, with the remaining 29-day period commencing on the following day. The deadline for the statement of defence and any counterclaim for revocation was accordingly set at 2 October 2026, 18:00.

2. A detail German lawyers may notice: “erneut” or “von neuem”?

There is another linguistic detail in the order that may catch the eye of lawyers familiar with German civil procedure.

The German text of Rule 296(3) published on the UPC website reads:

“beginnen die prozessualen Fristen erneut zu laufen.”

The Defendants, however, submitted the German wording as “von neuem zu laufen”. The Brussels Local Division expressly noted that this exact wording could not be found in the German translation available on the UPC website.

Interestingly, § 249 ZPO, which governs the effect of an interruption or stay (Unterbrechung or Aussetzung) on procedural time limits under German civil procedure, uses precisely the expression:

“die volle Frist von neuem zu laufen beginnt”

In other words, § 249 ZPO expressly provides for the full period to begin running anew.

This linguistic parallel should not be understood as suggesting that § 249 ZPO played any role in the Defendants’ submissions or in the Brussels Local Division’s interpretation of Rule 296(3) RoP. UPC proceedings are governed by the UPCA and the Rules of Procedure, not by the German ZPO.

As a matter of wording, however, the comparison is striking: “erneut zu laufen” and “die volle Frist von neuem zu laufen beginnt” neatly reflect the two competing approaches in the present case: resuming the original procedural period or starting the full period over again.

3. Is there already a uniform UPC approach?

Not yet.

The Brussels Local Division itself noted that different UPC divisions have implemented Rule 296(3) “in different ways.”

The order refers to the Munich Local Division’s Shangrao v. LONGi and the Hamburg Local Division’s Daedalus v. Xiaomi. Importantly, the Brussels Local Division phrased its reading of those orders cautiously: it considered that “it can be inferred” from them that, following the lifting of a stay, the initial procedural period begins to run afresh in full.

It also referred to the Nordic-Baltic Regional Division’s Edwards v. Meril. According to the Brussels Local Division, that order suggests an interpretation taking into account the circumstances of the case, procedural economy and flexibility.

The present order therefore does not establish a uniform UPC-wide interpretation of Rule 296(3). What it does establish is the position taken by the Brussels Local Division in this case: a stay suspends the procedural clock rather than resetting it.

Under that approach, if only a short period remains when proceedings are stayed, the resumption of the proceedings does not automatically give the party a new full procedural period. Only the remaining time continues to run once the proceedings are resumed.

Whether Rule 296(3) RoP will ultimately receive a uniform interpretation across the UPC remains to be seen.

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